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THE CONFUSING WORLD OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND JURISDICTION UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT - A
LOOK AT THE DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE OF THE
CURRENTLY EMPLOYED JURISDICTIONAL TESTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1890, the Sherman Act' - this country's first antitrust statute -
was passed to foster competition thought necessary to a capitalist economy.
2
Pursuant to its power under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitutions Congress proscribed contracts, combinations and con-
spiracies "in restraint of trade among the several States"4 and monopoliza-
tion or attempted monopolization of "any part of trade or commerce
among the several States."'5 Since the enactment of the Sherman Act,
one of the most perplexing issues confronting the courts and the antitrust
bar has been the jurisdictional reach of the act.
Some of the early judicial decisions dealing with the jurisdictional
scope of the statute reflected such a restrictive attitude that the ultimate
success of antitrust enforcement appeared doubtful.6 For example, in
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,7 the first Sherman Act case to reach
1. 15. U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647,
§ 1, 26 Stat. 209).
2. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Id. See
generally United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ; Carleson,
Role of the Antitrust Laws in the Democratic State, 47 N.w. U.L. REv. 587, 592-96
(1952) ; Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, Part I,
59 HARV. L. REv. 645, 646 (1946). The Northern Pacific Court noted:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.
It rests on the premise that the unrestrained competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and
social institutions.
356 U.S. at 4.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The commerce clause provides in pertinent part:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States...." Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V, 1975). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in
pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states ... is declared
to be illegal . . . ." Id.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V, 1975). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in
pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
felony ....
Id.
6. See generally Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation,
25 FED. B.J. 282 (1965).
7. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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the United States Supreme Court, the Court held that there was no
federal jurisdiction over a Philadelphia firm's alleged monopolization of
sugar refining because manufacturing was deemed to be a wholly local
activity notwithstanding the fact that raw materials and refined sugar
were shipped into and out of Pennsylvania.8 Similarly, in Federal Base-
ball Club v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,9 the Court
ruled that since the actual playing of a baseball game occurred within
only one state at any given time, there was no federal jurisdiction despite
the interstate travel of the teams. 10
Despite these early decisions, a more favorable judicial attitude soon
began to develop towards antitrust regulation." Within 4 years of
the Knight decision, the Supreme Court began to reevaluate its prior
restrictive jurisdictional approach. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States,12 the Court ruled that a price fixing agreement among
six iron pipe manufacturers in several states fell within the Act's juris-
diction since the combination directly affected both the manufacture of
the pipe and its national distribution.' 3 Six years later, the Court
extended its view of the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act still
further in Swift & Co. v. United States,1 4 wherein it announced that a
price fixing agreement between local meat dealers was federally adjudica-
ble because it was "aimed" at the flow of meat in interstate commerce. 15
8. Id. at 12, 17. See also Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
9. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
10. Id. at 208-09.
11. While the Court was changing its initial views of the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Sherman Act, Congress passed additional antitrust legislation in 1914:
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15,
1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730), prohibited price discrimination, tying arrangements,
certain corporate mergers and expressly provided for antitrust enforcement by private
individuals by way of injunctions and treble damage actions; and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26,
1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 724), prohibited, inter alia, unfair competition. However, the
jurisdictional reach of these acts was made narrower than that of the Sherman Act.
See note 36 infra.
12. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
13. Id. at 240-41. The Court distinguished Knight upon the ground that the
sugar monopoly in Knight was only concerned with manufacturing, a local activity,
and therefore had no direct connection with interstate commerce, while in Addyston
Pipe the illegal agreement itself was directed at both manufacturing and interstate
distribution. Id. at 240.
14. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
15. Id. at 398-99. The Court observed:
Although the combination alleged embraces restraint and monopoly of trade with-
in a single State, its effect upon commerce among the States is nct accidental,
secondary, remote or merely probable. On the allegations of the bill the latter
commerce no less, perhaps even more, than commerce within a single State is an
object of attack.
Id. at 396-97; cf. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate
Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914). See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
68-69 (1911) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1911).
[VOL. 21
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By 1931, the early decisions had apparently become dead letter law. As
the Court observed:
[W]hile manufacture [sic] is not interstate commerce, agreements
concerning it which tend to limit the supply or fix the price of goods
entering into interstate commerce, or which have been executed for
that purpose, are within the prohibition of the Act.16
And, although the Federal Baseball decision has never been overruled, 7
it has come to be understood as an aberration of the general rule in which
Congress has acquiesced 18 rather than an illustration of a general limita-
tion upon jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
Today, the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act is extensive in
comparison to both the early decisions and the jurisdictional operation
of other antitrust statutes.19 Unfortunately, this jurisdictional expansion
has proceeded at the expense of clearly defined and relatively easy-to-apply
rules. 20 As a result of this uncertainty some courts have recently demon-
strated an unwillingness to consider jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.21
Notwithstanding this judicial reluctance to give preliminary consideration
to the issue, and the fact that this area now encompasses many contra-
dictory and confusing decisions, 22 it is submitted that this area is one
16. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931). See generally
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948);
Eiger, supra note 6, at 282-84.
17. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees,
346 U.S. 356 (1953).
18. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1971); see, e.g., Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957); Note, Flood in the Land of Antitrust:
Another Look at Professional Athletics, The Antitrust Laws and the Labor Laws
Exemption, 7 IND. L. REv. 541 (1974).
19. See note 11 supra and note 36 infra.
20. The problem of defining the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act should
be compared to the better defined jurisdictional reach of other federal statutes promul-
gated pursuant to Congressional power under the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution such as the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh
(1970). See Note, Portrait of the Sherman Act as a Commerce Clause Statute, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 323, 325-26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Portrait of the Sherman Act].
21. See Section II infra. Typically, the courts will refuse to rule upon motions
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) (1), and instead deal only with the merits.
22. As the Third Circuit observed:
[N]o single, satisfactory test emerges from the precedent. When courts do speak
in terms of a test, the formulations used are, of necessity, so broad and generalized
that instead of providing a guide to the solution of the problems they do no more
than restate the issue. In reality, they are not tests at all. We believe that a more
accurate appraisal of the question is made by courts which concede that the issue
requires "a practical case-by-case economic judgment, not a conclusion derived
from application of abstract or mechanistic formulae." . . . That is, the issue is
one of degree which defies tests and which necessarily yields somewhat im-
precise resolutions.
As a result, the precedent in this area is unlikely to dictate the outcome in
any given case. Instead, it is more likely to communicate a general sense as to
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still worthy of close examination. The threshold determination of juris-
diction can still be critically important and desirable since antitrust
litigation can be both time-consuming and expensive. Quick considera-
tion and resolution of such a fundamental issue can often expedite a
settlement or save unnecessary delay and cost. Accordingly, this comment
will examine the current state of the jurisdictional law under the Sherman
Act by focusing upon: 1) The reason for the present confusion surround-
ing the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act and the resultant
refusal by some courts to consider jurisdictional questions; 2) The tests
which have been developed for examining jurisdictional challenges to the
application of the Sherman Act; and 3) The impact of Golfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,23 the Supreme Court's latest examination of this problem under
the Sherman Act.
II. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO SUMMARILY CONSIDER
THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE
The basis of most of the confusion surrounding the jurisdictional
reach of the Sherman Act may be traced to the act's rather curt and
enigmatic statutory language. The Sherman Act refers only to monopolies
and restraints of trade among the several states.2 4 In effect, this language
defines both the prohibited conduct and the jurisdictional range of the
statute. As a result, questions dealing with jurisdiction and questions
dealing with the merits are often factually interwoven since a restraint
of interstate commerce is not only a prerequisite for jurisdiction, but
also constitutes an element of the substantive violation.2 5 Because of
this interconnection, some courts have suggested that a summary disposi-
tion upon jurisdictional grounds is inappropriate in most antitrust actions.
As the Fifth Circuit observed:
Undoubtedly, under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure [now rule 12(b)(1)] a court may determine the pre-
requisites of jurisdiction in advance of a trial on the merits. How-
ever, where the factual and jurisdictional issues are completely
intermeshed the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits,
for it is impossible to decide the one without the other.2 6
how much of an impact local activities must have upon interstate commerce before
they confer jurisdiction.
Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 1973) (footnotes omitted),
noted in 20 VILL. L. REV. 426 (1975) ; see notes 94-103 and accompanying text infra.
23. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970).
25. The connection required between the conduct and interstate commerce may
vary depending on whether the allegations constitute a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act. Theoretically some connection is always required although in some con-
texts it may be judicially presumed. See notes 58-64 and accompanying text in!ra.
26. McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 361-62(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1968). See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 203 n.19 (1974) ; Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
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Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's view, other courts have recog-
nized that the substantive and jurisdictional inquiries are directed at
different factors:
[A]n important distinction should be stressed - the distinction
between the jurisdictional question, with which we are concerned,
and the question of whether, in other respects, a substantive violation
of the Sherman Act is alleged.
"[T]he phrase 'restraint of trade' which . . . had a well-understood
meaning at common law, was made the means of defining the activities
prohibited. The addition of the words 'or commerce among the
several states' was not an additional kind of restraint to be pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act but was the means used to relate the
prohibited restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional
purposes ... "
Whether a defendant's conduct constitutes a substantive Sherman
Act violation is entirely a matter of congressional definition: Is the
defendant's conduct the type of conduct Congress intended to pro-
hibit? Is that conduct a "restraint of trade" within the meaning of
section 1, or an "attempt" or "conspiracy" to "monopolize . . . trade"
within the meaning of section 2? The jurisdictional question, on the
other hand, concerns Congress' power to reach the defendant's
conduct: "[T]he restrain must 'occur in or affect commerce between
the states ... for constitutional reasons.' "27
According to this view28 the jurisdictional analysis should be directed
toward the possible connection between interstate commerce and the chal-
lenged activity. On the other hand, the substantive analysis should focus
upon whether, if a connection were found, interstate commerce was
restrained unreasonably.29  Of course, it is important to recognize the
interrelationship of those two analyses since without the required con-
nection, interstate commerce could not be restrained. Nevertheless, once
a connection is found, it does not automatically follow that there is an
unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce.30
27. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied by court).
28. This view has been followed by numerous courts. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg.
Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S.
820 (1975) ; Sun Valley Disposal v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1969); Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964); Page v.
Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
It should also be noted that even in those cases where lower court dismissals
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction have been reversed, it has usually been because
the lower court erred in not finding the requisite connection rather than because the
preliminary consideration of subject matter jurisdiction was found inappropriate.
See, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Doctor's,
Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
29. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
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Several recent circuit court decisions have indicated that the oppor-
tunity for all parties to develop a complete record relevant to the juris-
dictional issue is the most important factor which should be considered by
trial courts in determining the propriety of summary disposition. 81 It
should be noted, that it is unclear whether the judge or jury should
resolve questions of fact relating to jurisdiction when this approach is
used. 2 Regretably, a recent discussion of this problem by the Supreme
Court has provided little guidance. 33 Seemingly, the Court has left the
resolution of this issue to the discretion of the trial court:
[There is] no objection to reserving the jurisdictional issues until
a hearing on the merits. By the same token, however, there is no
objection to use, in appropriate cases, of summary judgment pro-
cedure to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to the interstate commerce element.3 4
III. JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT OF "INTERSTATE COMMERCE"
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
The Sherman Act has been construed as embodying the full scope of
Congressional power under the commerce clause. 35 As the boundaries
of that power have expanded, so has the extent of the statute's influence. 36
31. Mims v. Kemp, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 1 60,334 (4th Cir. 1975); A. Cherney
Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Sub. Refuse Disposal Ass'n, 484 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1973).
Employing this standard, courts would treat the motion not as one for dismissal
due to lack of jurisdiction which is decided based upon the pleadings under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) (1), but rather as one for summary judgment under FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b) (6) and 56. However, this may result in confusion between the jurisdictional
inquiry and a determination of the merits because a motion under rule 12(b) (6)
challenges the substantive sufficiency of the complaint. Thus, unless jurisdiction is now
considered an element of an antitrust charge or the courts are ignoring the language of
the rule, the jurisdictional inquiry may be inadvertently deferred to the merits.
32. Compare Washington State Bowling Prop. Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356
F.2d 371, 379 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966), with Evans v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,346 at 66,456. See also Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487
F.2d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1973).
33. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 203 n.19 (1975).
34. Id.
35. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); United
States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944); Rasmussen v.
American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 (9th Cir. 1954).
36. See generally E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
PRIMER 11-13 (1974); Eiger, supra note 6; Note, The Commerce Requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 22 HAST. L. REV. 1245, 1247-55 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
The Commerce Requirement].
In order to fully appreciate the broad scope of the jurisdictional tests which
have been developed for the Sherman Act, it is useful to note the more restrictive
standards used with other antitrust laws. For example, the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 12-27 (1970), which supplemented the Sherman Act in 1914, has been interpreted
to require that the illegal activiity must itself occur directly in the flow of
interstate commerce. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422
[VOL. 21.
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The tests currently employed for determining jurisdiction were not clearly
distinguished until the 1930's and 1940's when the Supreme Court began
to reexamine Congressional power under the commerce clause.8 7 Until
that time, this power was generally considered to apply only to activities
which were so directly concerned with interstate commerce as to be con-
ceptually included within its flow. 8 Then, in the landmark case of
Wickard v. Filburn,9 the Court enunciated an alternative analysis:
"[E]ven if . . . activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
U.S. 271 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201-02 (1974) ;
Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 476 (E.D. Mich.
1975); see Eiger, supra note 6 at 305. See generally E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE
DAMAGE ANTITRUST ACTIONS 219-45 (1965) [hereinafter cited as TIMBERLAKE].
Similarly for jurisdiction under the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Amend-
ment to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21a (1970), an actual interstate sale
must be involved. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-201 (1974) ;
see Eiger, supra note 6 at 297-305. See generally Timberlake, supra at 224-44; The
Commerce Requirement, supra.
Predictably, the validity of this "jurisdictional dichotomy" has occasionally
been questioned since "[ihe legislative history does not furnish even a bare suggestion
or inference that 'commerce' under the Clayton Act meant something less than it
meant under the Sherman Act." Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co., supra at 205 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Nevertheless, as recently as 1975 the Supreme Court refused to over-
rule the established precedent:
This argument [that the statutes should have the same jurisdictional standards]
from the history and practical purposes of the Clayton Act is neither without
force nor at least a measure of support. But whether it would justify radical
expansion of the Clayton Act's scope beyond that which the statutory language
defines - by judicial decision rather than amendatory legislation - is doubtful.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., supra at.202, (footnotes omitted).
Interestingly, the "amendatory legislation" required by the Court for change
might possibly be forthcoming in light of a recent amendment ot tl.e Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). That
statute, like the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, was orginally interpreted as
requiring activity to be "in" interstate commerce for the Commission to have juris-
diction. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); United States v. Piuma, 40 F.
Supp. 119 (S.D. Cal. 1941), aff'd, 126 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
637 (1942). However, early in 1975, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
was amended to prohibit "unfair methods of competition in or affecting interstate
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). The statute was amended because
Congress felt that restricting the Federal Trade Commission's regulatory power to
activities deemed to occur in interstate commerce was "unrealistic" in today's mobile
society, and in view of the reach of the Sherman Act.- H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, 4 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7713 (1975). This same rationale may lead Congress in
the future to make uniform the scope of all antitrust acts. Indeed, it should be noted
that recently a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives which would
extend the Clayton Act to include anticompetitive mergers "affecting interstate
commerce." H.R. REP. No. 9323, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975) ; see BNA 1975
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RPTR. (No. 729, 9/9/75 at A-14).
37. See generally Stern, supra note 2.
38. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Marrin, 289 U.S. 103, 108 (1933) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 169 (1931); Industrial Ass'n v. United States,
268 U.S. 64, 77 (1925) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911) ;
American Tobacco v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 116-17 (1911) ; Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230 (1899). But cf. Houston, E. & W.
Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
39. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce .... 40
Utilizing both the new "affecting interstate commerce" analysis and
the traditional "in the, flow of interstate commerce" analysis, the Supreme
Court proceeded in the next few years to extend the reach of the Sherman
Act to various local activities. First, jurisdiction was held proper over
local price fixing activities by liquor retailers because of the potential
affect the practice had upon the demand for out-of-state supplies. 41 There-
after, local taxi service for interstate travelers between train stations
was ruled to be part of a continuous interstate trip.42 Intrastate prepara-
tion of sugar from locally grown sugar beets 43 and local manufacturing of
garments 44 were also subjected to federal scrutiny because of their effect
upon interstate commerce.
In a short time, the two jurisdictional analyses which the Court
employed without entirely distinguishing between them became the two
separate tests applied by the courts today. As the Fourth Circuit observed
in a recent decision:
An antitrust plaintiff may establish the necessary connection
with interstate commerce in either of two ways: by demonstrating
that the alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred in interstate com-
merce, or by showing that the conduct, though wholly intrastate,
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 4
5
While at least one commentator has suggested that a single test in-
corporating an expanded concept of the "flow of interstate commerce"
might be more efficient, 48 the above tests have never been judicially ques-
tioned. As will be discussed below, because of the difference in the re-
quired effect upon interstate commerce under the two standards, it is
40. Id. at 125. This approach was not entirely novel. In 1914 the Court looked
to the economic effect on interstate commerce in permitting Congress to regulate
intrastate railroad rates. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport
Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342 (1914), cited in 317 U.S. 123-24. However, this "affecta-
tion" analysis was not expressly applied to Sherman Act cases until after Wickard.
See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
41. United States v. Frankford Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
42. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1947). However,
other local cab service which dealt with interstate trips only by chance was held to be
neither within the flow of commerce nor to affect it substantially. Id. at 230-33.
43. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948). This case overruled Knight since it dealt with the local manufacture of sugar.
Id. at 229-35.
44. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
45. Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 395 (4th Cir.
1974) ; accord, Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732,
739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954) ; United States v. Chrysler Corp.,
180 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1950). See generally Eiger, supra note 6; Note, Sherman
Act Challenges to Shopping Center Leases: Restrictive Covenants as Restraints of
Trade Under Section 1, 7 GA. L. REv. 311, 315-27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sher-
man Act Challenges]; Portrait of the Sherman Act, supra note 20; Comment, The
Antitrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 18 VILL.
L. REV. 721, 722-25 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Implications].
46. Eiger, supra note 6, at 287-88.
[VOL. 21728
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doubtful whether a combination of the two tests would be analytically
helpful.
A. The "In Interstate Commerce" Tests
Unfortunately, no precise definition for determining whether an
activity occurs within interstate commerce has ever been developed.
Instead, the question has been determined on a case-by-case basis in
accord with the Supreme Court guideline that
interstate commerce is an intensely practical concept drawn from
the normal and accepted course of business . . . . [T]he beginning
and end of a particular kind of interstate commerce [must be
marked] by its own practical considerations. 47
Accordingly, since each case involves different factual situations, prior
case law offers no specific legal formula. However, the factual situations
involved in Sherman Act precedent do at least illustrate some general
parameters of what is considered to be "in" interstate commerce :48 re-
moval and disposal of refuse across state lines, 49 distribution of consumer
products,50 exhibition of professional sports other than baseball,5 1 mainte-
nance of taxi service for interstate travelers between train stations, 52
dissemination of national news by newspapers,5" and transportation of
theatrical companies. 54
Although the determination of what is "in" interstate commerce has
been decided in each case upon an individual basis, one limitation that
has been applied fairly consistently by the courts is that the controversy
must involve the interstate activities of one of the parties to the lawsuit. 55
47. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218,.231 (1946).
48. See note 22 supra.
49. United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
50. United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1970).
51. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1952) ; see notes 17 & 18
and accompanying text supra.
52. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). But see note 42 supra.
53. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). But see Page v.
Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961) (publication of
local legal newspaper held not to be in interstate commerce).
54. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
55. The Ninth Circuit has noted: "[T]he Congressional power is not over per-
sons but over practices. It is irrelevant that a person is in some way engaged in
interstate commerce if the practice complained of is in no way related to that com-
merce." In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1973),
rev'd in part upon other grounds sub nom., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419
U.S. 186 (1974); accord, DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 516 F.2d 1, 4
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975); United States v. Finis P. Ernest, Inc.,
509 F.2d 1256, 1258-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975) ; Yellow Cab Co.
v. Cab Employees Local 881, 457 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970); Lieberthol v. North Country
Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1964). But see St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Lehrman v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077 (1972).
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As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "The test of jurisdiction is not that the
acts complained of affect a business engaged in interstate commerce, but
that the conduct complained of affects the interstate commerce of such
business."56 The significance of this limitation may be questioned when
the alternative "affecting" commerce test is available to invoke juris-
diction.57 At first glance, it may appear that the "in" interstate commerce
test is subsumed by the' "affecting" commerce test. However, this is not
so because of an important distinction between the two tests. Unlike the
"affecting" commerce standard, when the "in" interstate commerce ap-
proach is used, it is not always necessary to allege that the complained of
activity has had an impact on interstate commerce.
Curiously, the application of this distinction between the two tests
depends upon the type of substantive violation alleged. 58 If a per se
violation 9 is charged in an "in" interstate commerce context, for juris-
dictional as well as substantive purposes "the effect upon interstate com-
merce follows as a matter of law and is conclusively presumed . . . . There
need be no showing of the amount of commerce involved, and it is no
defense that the amount was small." 60 For example, in United States v.
Bensinger Co.,6 ' an alleged price fixing agreement as to a single indus-
trial dishwasher between local suppliers and their national manufacturer
was held to be adjudicable under the Sherman Act although the plan
was never carried out and the amount of commerce involved was ex-
tremely small because the violation was found to have occurred "in"
interstate commerce.6 2 On the other hand, under the "affecting" com-
merce doctrine, while per se violations give rise to the same presumption
56. Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
57. See section III-B infra.
58. It is, of course, questionable that a jurisdictional test should depend upon
substantive allegations for its application since, theoretically, once an activity is found
to occur within the flow of interstate commerce, given the scope of the Sherman Act,
the jurisdictional inquiry should be at an end. See notes 71-76 and accompanying
text infra.
59. A per se violation is a practice or agreement which, because of its pernicious
effect upon competition, is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ; see Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562 (1972) (illegal vertical combinations); United States v. Scaly, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967) (division of markets); Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials
Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (horizontal combinations).
60. United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 1970) (citations
omitted).
61. 430 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 589; accord, United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n,
357 F.2d 806, 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966) ; Las Vegas Merchant
Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 748-49 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 817 (1954); Cook v. Ralston Purina Co., 366 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (M.D. Ga.
1973); Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323,
1326 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1974).
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for substantive purposes, 63 they have no presumptive force for juris-
dictional purposes.
64
Currently, both private parties and the Government may avail them-
selves equally of the presumption that interstate commerce is affected by
the complained of activity in a per se case. At one time, however, private
litigants complaining of per se violations had a significantly larger burden
than did the Government. While the Government only had to show
activities "in" interstate commerce plus a per se violation, private plain-
tiffs had to show, in addition, that the defendant's actions were harmful
to the public by unduly restricting an appreciable part of interstate
commerce. 65 Because of this, private litigants always had to allege an
appreciable effect upon commerce to have their actions heard.66 How-
ever, in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores"7 and Radiant Burners v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co.,68 this requirement was abandoned. The
Court held:
[T]o state a claim upon which relief can be granted under [section 1
of the Sherman Act], allegations adequate to show a violation and,
in a private treble damage action, that plaintiff was damaged thereby
are all the law requires. 69
63. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210, 218-23
(1940).
64. See Section III-B infra.
65. Fedderson Motors v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950); accord,
Donlan v. Carvel, 209 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1962) ; Tobman v. Cottage Woodcraft
Shop, 194 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Brenner v. Texas Co., 140 F. Supp. 240
(N.D. Cal. 1956); Interborough v. Curtis Publishing Co., 127 F. Supp. 286 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See generally
Eiger, supra note 6, at 293-97.
66. See Eiger, supra note 6, at 293-94. The requirement that the plaintiff allege
public harm was not actually jurisdictional but rather substantive as plaintiff's failure
to comply was properly challenged with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. However, because of the similarity between having to show harm to
the public and an effect upon commerce the discussion of this issue is relevant here.
It certainly did not help a private plaintiff very much to say that because of his per se
allegations the effect upon commerce was presumed without any supportive allegations
while at the same time such allegations were required to meet the substantive element
of "public harm."
67. 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Klor's involved a group boycott of electrical appliance
retailers and suppliers engaged in an attempt to put a small appliance store out of
business. Id. at 207-08. Although the Court recognized that even if the defendants'
aim was accomplished, consumers would not be hurt because of the small size of the
plaintiff's operation, the dismissal of the action was reversed. Id. at 213.
68. 364 U.S. 656 (1961). In Radiant Burners plaintiff attacked a group of burner
manufacturers and gas suppliers who refused to furnish gas for its burners because of
failure to secure design approval. Id. at 658.
69. Id. at 660. Interestingly, although Radiant Burners clearly did away with
the "public injury" requirement, defendants have continued to raise it. See, e.g., Allied
Elec. Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973). However, courts
have consistently rejected their arguments. Id. at 138; accord, Cooper Liquor, Inc.
v. Adolph Coors & Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975) ; Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy
Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973). Today,
the only real distinction between the government and private litigants in this area is
that the private plaintiff must have sustained injury personally in order to have stand-
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On the other hand, it is less certain whether the allegation of an
effect upon interstate commerce is required in a "rule of reason" 70 case.
While there is some dicta which indicates that in such a case, an effect
upon commerce must be alleged before jurisdiction will be sustained, 71
it is debatable whether this view is justified. The question of judicial
jurisdiction involves the inherent power of the tribunal to decide a given
dispute.7 2 Since it is well settled that Congress can regulate activities which
occur "in" interstate commerce 73 and that the Sherman Act is intended
to reflect the full scope of this power,7 4 jurisdiction should be taken once
it is determined that the violations had occurred in the flow of such com-
merce.75  Therefore, the degree to which commerce is affected should
be viewed, not as a jurisdictional requirement, 76 but rather as a sub-
stantive element which the plaintiff must prove - that interstate com-
merce was unreasonably restrained.
B. The "Affecting Commerce" Test
Unlike other federal antitrust statutes, Sherman Act jurisdiction
may still be invoked if the violation did not occur "in" the flow of
interstate commerce.7 7 Under the "affecting commerce" test, even if
activities are wholly intrastate, there will be federal jurisdiction if they
ing to sue. See, e.g., Bowen v. Wohl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
See generally ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 265-67 (1975).
70. In a "rule of reason" case an unreasonable restraint of trade must be provided.
United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). As the Supreme Court observed:
An analysis of the reasonableness of particular restraints includes consideration
of the facts peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature
of the restraint and its effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons
for its adoption.
Id. at 607.
71. United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1970); Ford
Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 n.1 (N.D.
Cal. 1972).
72. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 612 (1965).
73. See generally Stern, supra note 2.
74. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
75. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 511 F.2d 678, 683
n.2 (4th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit observed:
The volume, amount, or quantity of interstate commerce involved is irrelevant
under the "in commerce" test . . . . [I]f anticompetitive conduct occurs in com-
merce, to whatever degree, the Sherman Act is triggered.
Id.
76. See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, those few cases which
have involved refusals to apply the per se presumption have dealt with motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) going to the merits rather than motions under the
Federal rules challenging jurisdiction. United States v. Bensinger Co., 430 F.2d 584
(8th Cir. 1970) ; Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 344 F. Supp.
1323 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
77. But see note 36 supra. It is presumed that this will now also be true of
jurisdiction under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
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substantially affect interstate commerce.78 As stated by the United States
Supreme Court:
The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of a
contract or combination usually is; the application of the restraint
may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters if the necessary
effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among the states. If it is
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local
the operation which applies the squeeze.79
Similar to the uncertain standards involved with the "in" interstate
commerce analysis,8 0 no adequate standard has been devised to determine
how substantial an effect is required with the "affecting commerce"
analysis.8 ' Although this lack of a clear standard has necessitated a
case-by-case approach,8 2 courts have frequently focused upon factors such
as continuity, frequency, and size of the flow of supplies moving through
interstate commerce to the parties involved in order to determine whether
the effect was substantial. For instance, where constant replenishment
of articles from out of state was essential to the operation of the businesses
involved and where the violation had a potential detrimental affect upon
that demand, jurisdiction has been approved upon the grounds that
interstate commerce was substantially affected.83 In contrast, had the
"in commerce" test been applied, jurisdiction probably would have been
denied because the supplies would have been deemed to have "come to
rest" in the recipient's possession and were, therefore, out of the flow
of commerce.8 4
78. Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.
1974) ; Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
79. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1948)
(emphasis added).
80. See notes 47-54 and accompanying text supra.
81. See Krotinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 66, 71-73 (1963).
82. See note 22 supra.
83. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (sale of liquor); United States v. Em-
ploying Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) (plastering supplies) ; Rasmussen v.
American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973)
(ingredients of dairy drink); Washington State Bowling Prop. Ass'n v. Pacific
Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1966) (bowling supplies); Plum Tree, Inc. v.
N.K. Winston Corp., 351 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (franchised merchandise);
Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tyson's Corner Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 429 F.2d 206 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (supplies received for shopping center).
See generally, Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 DuKE L.J. 236;
Sherman Act Challenges, supra note 45, at 311; Note, The Antitrust Implications of
Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 86 HARv. L. Rxv. 1201 (1973);
Antitrust Implications, supra note 45, at 721.
84. See Evans v. S.S. Kresge, 1975-1 Trade Cas. f" 60,349, at 66,460 (W.D. Pa.
1975); John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz, 313 F. Supp. 435, 438 (W.D. Wash.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971); United
States v. Food & Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 966, 977 (S.D. Cal. 1942). The validity
of the "come to rest doctrine" has been criticized in the context of Sherman Act liti-
gation. See Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 526 (9th Cir. 1973) ;
cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964). Normally, the doctrine has
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Recently, this "effect on supply flow" analysis has been used to
sustain jurisdiction over violations dealing with food distribution and
hospital services. In Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co.,85
a distributor of Polish hams in the Detroit area sued a local manufacturer
of meat products, alleging violations of both the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. The defendant-manufacturer purchased and distributed some of
the same products as did the plaintiff-distributor, and it was alleged that
the defendant had attempted to tie the sale of the overlapping items to
both the sale of its own products and the use of a sign bearing the de-
fendant's trademark. 6 During the year in question, plaintiff purchased
approximately $600,000 and defendant $500,000 worth of merchandise
from outside of Michigan."1 Despite these sizable out-of-state purchases
of the overlapping products by both the plaintiff and the defendant, the
court dismissed the Clayton Act charge finding that the activities had
not occurred "in" interstate commerce.88 However, the court retained
jurisdiction over the Sherman Act allegation by applying the "affecting
commerce" test,8 9 and by distinguishing the litigation before it from an
earlier case, Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n,90 which
dealt with an alleged violation of the Sherman Act involving apartment
rentals in the Michigan area. In Marston, the court held that the effect
upon the flow of out-of-state supplies and lessees was "incidental" because
the conspiracy in question was aimed only at the local apartment market.91
The Detroit City Dairy court found the two situations to be distinguish-
able because in its case, the alleged restraint was found to be "directly"
involved with the flow of the meat products.9 2 Thus, in view of the
been applied to the question of state taxation. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 419, 441 (1827). However, because of the availability of the "affecting
commerce" test, the point is seemingly moot. Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n,
supra at 526.
85. 393 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
86. Id. at 457. A tying arrangement has been defined as "an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product
from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958). In Detroit City Dairy it was charged that the tying arrangement constituted
both a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), and section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). 393 F. Supp. at 457.
87. Id. at 475.
88. Id. at 475-79. The court ruled that the out-of-state goods which defendant had
ordered had "come to rest" in its warehouse and were no longer "in" the flow of
commerce because they were not intended for any specific customer. Id.; see note 84
supra. See also section III-A and note 36 supra.
89. 393 F. Supp. at 473-76.
90. 302 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Mich. 1969), aft'd, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
91. 302 F. Supp. at 1279. But see Brachter v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381
F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). See generally note 139 infra.
92. 393 F. Supp. at 475. But see Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48, 53
(3d Cir. 1973); text accompanying notes 94-103 and section V infra.
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amount of commerce involved and the potential affect the tying arrange-
ment upon the amount of goods ordered by plaintiff and other distributors,
jurisdiction was retained.9 3
Similarly, in the area of hospital care, the termination of a small
hospital's affiliation with a medical insurance carrier was challenged in
Doctor's, Inc. v. Blue Cross.9 4 Prior to Doctor's, medical services gen-
erally, 5 and hospital services in particular, 96 were considered too local
an activity for scrutiny under the Sherman Act. The Third Circuit,
however, rejected this approach as being inconsistent with the current
"supply flow theory" developed in other areas9 7 and analyzed the allega-
tions in terms of their affect upon hospital supplies. The plaintiff alleged
that it annually received $233,000 worth of supplies from out-of-state and
asserted that if defendant's plans were carried out it would be forced
out of business.98 Additionally, the Doctor's court suggested that de-
fendant's activities could have an identical effect upon 100 other hospitals
in the region with similar needs for out-of-state supplies.9 9 The Third
Circuit concluded that the potential effect upon the interstate flow of
hospital supplies in the event these institutions ceased to function was
sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. 10 0 This position was taken despite
the fact that the alleged violation was not "directly" related to the inter-
93. 393 F. Supp. at 475. Although Detroit City Dairy is consistent with past
"supply flow" cases, the opinion did contain some potentially confusing dicta. First,
the court suggested that even under the "affect commerce" test, jurisdiction can be
taken without an allegation of substantial affect upon interstate commerce and that
the magnitude of the effect was a substantive question. Id. at 474. However, the
court does not seem to have actually relied upon this approach since it found that
there was a large amount of supplies involved in the case. Id. at 475. Secondly,
although the court used the "affect commerce" test for jurisdiction, it also stated that
the litigants were engaged "in" interstate commerce. Id. at 475-76. It is questionable
whether the court actually meant that the parties were engaged "in" interstate com-
merce. If such was the case, given the fact that the tying arrangement alleged was
a per se violation, the "in" interstate commerce test would have obviated the need for
showing any affect at all for the purposes of jurisdiction. See notes 59-69 and
accompanying text supra.
94. 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973), noted in The Third Circuit Review, 20 VILL. L.
REV. 426 (1975). Plaintiff alleged that Blue Cross, the largest major-medical insur-
ance carrier in Philadelphia and the Hospital Survey Committee, Inc., a private, non-
profit advisory planning agency, conspired to control hospital services in the region.
490 F.2d at 49. By terminating plaintiff's affiliation, the defendants could drive it
out of business since patients insured with Blue Cross would no longer be able to
use its facilities under their policies. Id.
95. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
96. Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167, 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 884 (1959); Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F2d 125, 126-27
(10th Cir. 1952); Nankin Hosp. v. Michigan Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 1199, 1210
(E.D. Mich. 1973).
97. 490 F.2d at 52-53.
98. Id. at 51.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 51-53.
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state items as was considered important by the Detroit City Dairy court. 110
The Third Circuit, citing several Supreme Court opinions, 10 2 held:
There is no discussion of "directness" or of the specific relationship
between the interstate goods affected and the local market con-
trolled . . . Instead, the Court . . . ends its inquiry when it has
satisfied itself that the logical and therefore probable effect of the
alleged act is to reduce the flow of goods in interstate commerce.
0 3
The "affecting commerce" test has also been applied to the less
common situation where activities are alleged to prevent something from
ever entering the flow of interstate commerce. In Devoto v. Pacific
Fidelity Life Insurance Co.,'04 agents of an out-of-state insurance com-
pany, challenged an agreement between a local mortgage company and
a local insurer whereby the mortgage company supplied lists of mortgagors
exclusively to the local insurer to facilitate its solicitation of mortgage
insurance.1 5 Noting that insurance transactions can fall within the range
of antitrust violations, 10 the Ninth Circuit ruled that jurisdiction over the
dispute would lie because the agreement interfered with the interstate
flow of mortgagor lists, insurance policies, premiums, and information
about the defendant's mortgagors. 10 7 Interestingly, the Devoto court did
not comment upon the magnitude of the interstate flow as did the courts in
Detroit City and Doctor's.0 s
It should be noted, however, that where the flow of supplies across
state borders has not been sufficiently continuous, or where there has
been no reason to believe that the flow would be diminished by the
complained of practices, jurisdiction has been denied. 10 9 As one district
court observed: "The incidental flow of supplies in interstate commerce
does not in itself transform an essentially intrastate activity into an inter-
101. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
102. Id. at 52-53, citing Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam);
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
103. 490 F.2d at 53 (footnotes omitted). See also St. Bernard Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1975); United States Dental Ass'n v.
American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 11 60,369 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
Although Doctor's may be interpreted as suggesting a very expansive reading of the
"affecting commerce" text, the court did not want its decision to be construed as com-
pletely negating the interstate commerce requirement for Sherman Act jurisdiction.
Id. at 53-54. Indeed, the Third Circuit cited examples of federal courts properly re-
fusing jurisdiction when the "flow of supplies into the state [was not] substantial
enough to confer jurisdiction." Id. at 54, citing Lieberthol v. North Country Lanes,
323 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964), and Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1961) ; see
notes 109-18 and accompanying text infra.
104. 516 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 894 (1975).
105. Id. at 2-3. In fact, plaintiffs in DeVoto had signed a contract with the loan
company to receive such lists but the loan company reneged and decided to continue
dealing exclusively with its codefendant. Id.
106. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
107. 516 F.2d at 5.
108. See notes 96-103 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text infra.
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state enterprise."" 0 For example, in Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes,
Inc.,"I it was held that the "one shot" event of outfitting a bowling
alley with out-of-state equipment did not constitute a sufficient effect upon
commerce. 112 Similarly, in Page v. Work," 3 a suit filed by the former
owners of a local legal newspaper receiving newsprint from another state
charging that they were forced out of business as a result of defendants'
alleged illegal activities, jurisdiction was denied because there was no
allegation that the new owners ordered any less newsprint from out of
state." 4 Other examples of courts denying jurisdiction because of a de
minimus connection with interstate commerce include: local mortuary
services, despite the fact that some of the supplies and bodies came from
out of state;115 local taxi service;"" local refuse removal, although the
equipment used in the business had initially been purchased in another
state," 7 and the administration of a state bar review course, notwith-
standing an involvement with out-of-state students and advertising.118
Recently, jurisdiction has been refused in two cases where the juris-
dictional allegations were similar to those in Detroit City Dairy and
Doctor's. In Evans v. S.S. Kresge Co.," 9 the trustee in bankruptcy of a
local Pennsylvania supermarket management company challenged the
110. St. Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1045,
1048 (D. Minn. 1970). Indeed, if this were not the case, any business which used
out-of-state goods or serviced out-of-state customers, no matter how few, would be
subject to federal scrutiny. This would necessarily result in the elimination of the
jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce. See note 103 supra.
111. 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).
112. Id. at 272.
113. 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961).
114. Id. at 332.
115. John Kalin Funeral Home, Inc. v. Fultz, 313 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wash.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 881 (1971).
116. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). In Yellow Cab two
types of cab service were involved - normal city wide service and special contract
service between interstate train stations. The latter service was found to be an in-
tegral part of interstate commerce since it was seen as part of a continuous interstate
trip. Id. at 228-29; see note 42 and accompanying text supra. However, the normal
service was found to be too local to be in interstate commerce or to have any sub-
stantial affect upon it. Id. at 230-33.
117. Sun Valley Disposal Co. v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.
1969). But see United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966). In Pennsylvania Refuse, the Govern-
ment alleged that the members of the defendant-association transported large amounts
of refuse across state lines and for this reason the Third Circuit ruled that the activity
was "in" interstate commerce. 357 F.2d at 808. In Sun Valley, however, although
plaintiff alleged that defendants actually served clients in another state, the Ninth
Circuit held that this was a separate part of the defendnt's business and not related
to the charged violations. 420 F.2d at 343-44.
118. Kallen v. Nexus Corp., 335 F. Supp. 33 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But see United
States Dental Ass'n v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 1 60,369
(N.D. Ill. 1975).
119. 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,349 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
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provisions of a licensing agreement with a national discount department
store in which the management company agreed to operate several food
markets under defendant's trade name and adjacent to defendant's
stores. 120 Plaintiff objected to, inter alia, the requirement that the man-
agement corporation adhere to established prices on items sold by both
stores.121 In order to establish jurisdiction, plaintiff stressed the fact
that $400,000 worth of supplies received by the food stores during the
past year had come from outside of Pennsylvania. 122
Initially, the Evans court noted the confusion surrounding the juris-
dictional and substantive requirements of interstate commerce under the
Sherman Act.123 Nevertheless, it concluded that in the instant case, sum-
mary pretrial disposition of the jurisdictional question was both warranted
and proper, 124 and further, that it was more appropriate for the court
than the jury to decide the issue.125 Jurisdiction under the "in com-
merce" test was ruled out because the goods which the stores received
from other states had "come to rest" on the stores' shelves, and were,
therefore, no longer in the flow of commerce. 126 Then, as in Detroit City
Dairy, the court looked to the results of the alleged violation in applying
the "affecting commerce" test. The Evans court noted that although a
large quantity of goods had come into the state, there was no reason to
conclude that the agreement had in any way affected their demand. In
short, no relation was established between the alleged activity and the
interstate goods. 27
120. Id. at 66,450-52.
121. Id. at 66,541. The other allegations were that plaintiff's bankrupt had to:
1) maintain merchandise competitive in price to that offered in the surrounding trade
area; 2) limit merchandising of nonfood items to specific types; 3) refrain from en-
tering into fair trade agreements; 4) refrain from issuing trading stamps; and 5) use
equipment furnished by defendant. Id. at 66,451-52.
122. Id. at 66,458.
123. See generally section II supra.
124. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 66,452-55.
125. Id. at 66,456; see note 32 and accompanying text supra.
126. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 66,457-60. The Evans court stated:
We hold that the retail sale of groceries to the general public are transactions
consummated locally, involving commodities of a local character having been pre-
viously diverted from the flow of commerce.
Id. at 66,460; see note 84 and accompanying text supra.
127. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 66,463-64. The court observed:
We do not believe that any evidence exists which shows or suggests that
the interstate commerce in groceries was either enhanced or disminished by the
agreement. Nor do we believe that the conduct complained of restricted [the food
stores'] latitude in dealing with its suppliers. In short, we find that the alleged
conduct had nothing to do with whatever interstate commerce [the stores' man-
agement firm] might have engaged in during the course of its operation of the
stores in question. Therefore, we have no jurisdiction.
Id. at 66,464 (footnote omitted).
To reach the decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Evans
court also had to distinguish the case before it from the Supreme Court's decision in
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See note 67 and accom-
panying text supra. Klor's seemingly stood for the proposition that driving a small
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In the other recent case rejecting jurisdiction, Hospital Building Co.
v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,12 a 49-bed hospital in the Raleigh, North
Carolina, area charged a competing hospital and other individuals engaged
in providing local hospital and medical services with conspiring to prevent
it from expanding to 140 beds. 129 For jurisdictional purposes, plaintiff
alleged that because it was unable to expand as scheduled, its out-of-state
purchases of supplies and management services from its parent corpora-
tion, and its billings to national insurance companies and the federal
government did not increase as they otherwise would have.130 Also, the
$4 million cost of expansion was to be financed with funds supplied
from outside of North Carolina. 31 Despite plaintiff's allegations, the
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.13 2 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the above allegations did not con-
stitute a sufficiently direct and substantial impact upon interstate com-
merce. 133 Doctor's was distinguished upon the ground that in the instant
case there could be
no significant comparison between the effect on commerce of one
small hospital's delayed expansion, especially when other hospitals
contemplate expansion, and the vastly greater effect of the possible
closing of a significant percentage of the hospitals in a metropolitan
area.
3 4
businessman out of business could sufficiently affect interstate commerce for the pur-
poses of jurisdiction, given the possibility of similar attacks upon like enterprises was
considered. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, supra at 213. However, the
Evans court distinguished Kor's upon the ground that the plaintiff in Kor's was
prevented from buying goods passing in interstate commerce for local resale by an
alleged boycott. While in Evans, the court found that the alleged activity had no
relation to the demand of interstate goods. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 66,463-64.
128. 511 F.2d 678 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975).
129. Id. at 681. It was charged that the defendants had violated sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act when they attempted to block the authorization of the expansion
required under North Carolina law and instigated adverse publicity concerning the
plaintiff's operations. Id.
130. Id. at 683-84.
131. Id. at 684.
132. The district court's opinion was not reported. The Fourth Circuit was not
certain whether the dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a.
cause of action as both 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6) motions were filed. 511 F.2d at 680.
However, the circuit court treated the district court's dismissal as a substantive ques-
tion under rule 12(b) (6) and concluded that jurisdiction over the subject matter was.
expressly conferred by the Sherman Act. Id. at 680-81. However, it should be noted
that in so doing the court ignored the fact that Sherman Act jurisdiction could con-
stitutionally be applied only to transactions having the requisite nexus with interstate.
commerce. See note 3 supra.
133. 511 F.2d at 684. As in Detroit City Dairy, and unlike Doctor's, the court
required that a "direct" affect upon interstate commerce be alleged. Id.; see notes.
91, & 98 & 99 and accompanying text supra. The validity of this requirement was
strongly disputed by the dissent which suggested that Doctor's was controlling on
the point. Id. at 688-89 (Winters, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 684. The court indicated that it believed the instant situation was.
closer to Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964) and
Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961), than to,
Doctor's. 511 F.2d at 684-85. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text supra.
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However, the Rex Hospital court did not stop there' 35 but further ex-
plained that the most important factor in its decision was an examination
of the "potential power of [the] conspiracy."'18 6 Noting that in the instant
case, the defendants merely possessed enough influence to delay plaintiff's
plans, the majority stated that
the real difference between our case and Doctors, Inc. may be not
so much the quantitative difference in effect on interstate commerce
as the dramatic difference in anticompetitive power - the danger
Congress sought to guard against.18 7
C. Summary
As Sherman Act litigation continued into the 1960's and 1970's
plaintiffs began to call upon the federal judiciary to deal with disputes
of an increasingly local nature. Not surprisingly, in dealing with these
suits courts generally employed the more liberal "affecting commerce"
analysis. Unfortunately, since there has. been no concrete guidance from
the United States Supreme Court, lower federal courts have been forced
to fend for themselves. The result is the "patch-quilt" collection of
cases presently found in the area. Certainty has been virtually non-
existent since each court will approach a given dispute as involving unique
factual circumstances.
IV. Goldfarb v; Virginia State Bar: AN ANALYSIS
In early 1975, the Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity
to clarify jurisdictional law under the Sherman Act in the case of Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar.138 However, the Court's treatment of the
jurisdictional question could well lead to more confusion about this
issue than already exists.
In Goldfarb, the fee schedule of a local bar association which pro-
vided for a minimum fee for title searches was challenged as a price fixing
135. The Fourth Circuit, upon finding that the affect upon interstate commerce
was insubstantial or de minimis noted that such determinations were too inexact. The
court observed:
Whether or not "deminimis" has ever been an effective litmus for application of
the Sherman Act, we doubt that it now is, and we are concerned that conventional




137. Id. at 686 (emphasis supplied by the court). The dissent disagreed with the
majority's distinguishing of Doctor's suggesting instead that the anticompetitive power
charged was sufficiently substantial:
If by means of conspiracy and harassment those who hold a local market can fore-
close or limit the entry of competition, capital, and initiative from out-of-state, then
it seems to me that the federal interest in interstate commerce is directly involved.
Id. at 689 (Winters, J.' dissenting).
138. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See generally Comment, Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar - Professional Legal Services Are Held to be Within the Ambit of Federal
Antitrust Laws, 7 LOYOLA L.J. 254 (1976).
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arrangement violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 39 The title
searches covered by the price schedule were part of local real estate trans-
actions in which out-of-state money was often used.
140
A. Supreme Courts Analysis
In ruling that the local bar association's minimum fee schedule was
subject to attack under the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court chose not to
analyze plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations in terms of the tests presently
employed by the lower courts..41 Because of this, it is submitted that the
139. In Goldfarb, petitioners, a husband and wife who wished to purchase a home
in Fairfax County, Virginia, objected to the state and local bar associations' minimum
fee schedule for a title search which they were required to obtain by their lender.
Id. at 775-76. Under Virginia law, such an examination could only be performed by
an attorney. Unauthorized Practice of Law, Opinion No. 17, August 5, 1942, VIRGINIA
STATE BAR - OPINIONs 239 (1965 ed.). The Goldfarbs found that every practitioner
who responded to their inquiries insisted upon charging at least the minimum scheduled
amount, which was 1 percent of the value of the property involved. 421 U.S. at 776.
Petitioners had the work done by one of the lawyers who billed according to the
minimum fee schedule and then filed a class action suit against both the state and
local bar associations alleging that the fee suggested by each of the attorneys they con-
tacted constituted price fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 778.
Interestingly, prior to Goldfarb, few cases had ever dealt with the Sherman
Act's applicability to seemingly local real estate transactions. Those cases which did
examine local real estate transactions often produced conflicting results. For example,
in Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam),
the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal upon jurisdictional grounds of
a complaint charging a conspiracy by local realtors to prevent blacks from renting
property in white neighborhoods where this impeded the interstate flow of persons,
mortgage financing, and building materials. Id. at 724. However, 3 years later,
in Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970), another panel in the same circuit affirmed, without opinion,
the dismissal of a complaint filed by university students alleging an effect upon inter-
state commerce similar to the effects alleged in Bratcher. See notes 90 & 91 and
accompanying text supra.
140. 421 U.S. at 783.
141. Initially, the district court dismissed the action against the state bar associa-
tion upon the nonjurisdictional ground that "[ijn its minor role in this matter, the
Virginia State Bar was engaged in state action," and was therefore immune from suit
under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which immunized "state
action" from antitrust attack. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 496(E.D. Va. 1973). However, rejecting the county bar association's claim that its
members' activities were too local to permit invocation of the Sherman Act, the trial
court sustained the action against the local bar association finding it guilty of the
charged violation. Id. at 494-96. In so doing, the court rejected the county bar
association's claim that its members' activities were entirely too local to permit iu-
vocation of the federal statute. Id. at 494. The district court also rejected the local
association's claim that it was immune from antitrust actions upon the alternative
grounds that its activities were included within the "state action" exemption of Parker
v. Brown, supra, because lawyers, as members of a "learned profession," were not
engaged in "trade or commerce" as defined under the Sherman Act. Id. at 494-96.
Instead, the following factors were held determinative in sustaining jurisdiction against
local association: 1) a "significant portion of funds" - tens of millions of out-
of-state dollars - were used to finance the home purchases; 2) a "large percentage"
of the people who lived in Fairfax County worked outside the state (several thousand
people were estimated to work outside of Virginia); and 3) a "significant amount" of
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Court's opinion will do little to ameliorate the uncertainty surrounding
such questions. Although neither the "in commerce" nor the "affecting
commerce" tests lends itself to quick and easy resolution of jurisdictional
problems, 142 they do at least provide a workable framework for analysis.
The Goldfarb Court, however, utilized a more ad hoc approach, combining
elements from both standards in reviewing the findings of the trial court.
Unlike the treatment of the case given by the Fourth Circuit,143 the
United States Supreme Court looked beyond the essentially local nature
of the practice of law involved in title searches. Chief Justice Burger, speak-
ing for a unanimous court in finding minimum price schedules for title
searches subject to scrutiny under the Sherman Act's ban upon price
fixing, focused upon two different factors. First, the Court found that
the title searches were "an integral part" of the larger transactions of
financing local home purchases with out-of-state money - transactions
which occurred in interstate commerce.1 4 4 Secondly, because of the large
amount of funds flowing into Virginia, it was held that a sufficiently
substantial effect upon interstate commerce for jurisdiction was alleged
even though the character of this effect was never described. 145 Inter-
loans on Fairfax County real property were guaranteed by the United States Veterans
Administration and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. at 497.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment against the local bar
association upon the jurisdictional and "learned profession" arguments, and affirmed
the district court's decision as to immunity of the state bar association. Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13-19 (4th Cir. 1974). The appellate court opined
that jurisdiction as to the claim against the local bar would lie only if the effect upon
commerce was both "direct and substantial" and the majority concluded that the
findings of the district court failed to establish this element. Id. at 16-17. But see
notes 101-03 and accompanying text supra. The members of the local bar were con-
cerned solely with the general practice of law in the Fairfax County area and did
not solicit out-of-state business. 497 F.2d at 18. It was, the court reasoned, only
toward the local practice of law that the restraint was directed and therefore, it was
merely "fortuitous" that petitioners sought the help of defendant's members in secur-
ing a loan from a non-Virginia source. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted:
We are constrained to hold that the Association sought to regulate only "general
local services." The fact that those services are occasionally used by persons who
are simultaneously engaged in an ancillary interstate transaction to facilitate the
conduct of that transaction is merely "incidental"; this does not justify federal
regulation of competitive restraints upon a business which is "wholly local"
in character.
Id. at 18.
142. See note 22 supra.
143. In addition to reversing the jurisdictional holding of the Fourth Circuit, the
court also ruled that the county bar was not immune under the "state action" exemp-
ion and that the practice of law was included in the definition of "trade or commerce"
in the Sherman Act. 421 U.S. at 781-93.
144. Id. at 783-84.
145. Id. at 785. Although this was the first case in which the Sherman Act was
applied to the legal profession, the Chief Justice stressed that the decision was not to
be read as unilaterally subjecting all legal services to such scrutiny. Id. at 792-93.
It was the connection that the challenged activity had with a substantial amount of
interstate commerce which allowed for the instant examination. It was conceded
that there could be legal services which did not have this critical connection and
which would therefore be outside of the statute's scope. Id. at 785.
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estingly, while it was conceded that there was no allegation of a detrimental
,effect upon interstate commerce resulting from the defendant's practices,
.such a charge was held to be unnecessary. 146
B. Meaning of Goldfarb
Goldfarb is subject to three different interpretations. 147 First, it is
:arguable that the Court decided that the operation of the two traditional
tests had become too restrictive and that it was necessary to apply the
Sherman Act more flexibly to keep up with an economy that was be-
coming increasingly national in scope.148 However, such reasoning would
appear inconsistent with the present Court's otherwise conservative atti-
tude towards antitrust jurisdiction as evidenced by its rulings in two
recent Clayton Act cases. 1 49 In each of these Clayton Act cases, the Court
demonstrated a great reluctance to expand the scope of jurisdiction under
the statute in light of Congressional inaction in this area. 150
If Goldfarb is not to be understood as negating the relevance of the
traditional jurisdictional tests, its significance then depends upon whether
it is viewed as an "in commerce" or an "affecting commerce" case.
Although legal services are normally considered inherently local,' 5' the
Court emphasized that title searches were part of an activity occurring in
interstate commerce. 52  Thus characterized, the case would seem to be
completely consistent with the earlier "in commerce" cases.153 Since
146. Id. Although the Court held that "[pletitioners clearly proved that the fee
schedule fixed fees and 'deprive[d] purchasers or consumers of the advantages which
they derived from free competition' " this effect was allegedly only felt in the local
legal services market. Id. at 783-85. Nowhere did the Court discuss the alleged harm
to the flow of out-of-state financing - the basis for jurisdiction - as did the Doctor's
and Detroit City Dairy courts. See notes 85-103 and accompanying text supra. For
a discussion of how two cases after Goldfarb have dealt with the problems, see notes
170-75 and accompanying text infra.
147. A fourth possibility unrelated to antitrust theory, is that the Court, in light
of recent developments involving the integrity of government, might have felt com-
pelled to seize the opportunity to show that the judiciary was not hesitant to regulate
the legal profession. The Court could have ruled that the practices of the local bar
association were too local for federal attention and regulation thereof was to be left
to state antitrust administration. See generally section III-B supra. Nevertheless,
it is doubtful that such a decision would have enhanced the public esteem for the
legal profession.
148. See generally Portrait of the Sherman Act, supra note 20, at 323.
149. United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
150. See generally note 36 supra.
151. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 17-19 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
152. 421 U.S. at 784. The defendant argued that the instant case was controlled
by United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), in which the Court ruled
that ordinary local taxi service was too local for action under the Sherman Act. How-
ever, the Goldfarb Court held that the activities in the instant case were more-like
the contract cab service between interstate train stations also involved in Yellow Cab
which was found to be in interstate commerce. 421 U.S. at 784 n.13. See note 42 supra.
153. See Section III-A supra.
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price fixing is a per se violation,'5 the only jurisdictional allegation which
would be required would be a connection between the violation and inter-
state commerce. 155 This burden could easily be met in Goldfarb since
the services for which the prices were fixed formed a part of the interstate
transaction.
*Wrhile Goldfarb may add nothing to jurisdictional law if viewed
as an "in commerce" case, if viewed as an "affecting commerce" case it
could dramatically change the application of that standard. The flow of
out-of-state money was critical in finding jurisdiction in Goldfarb. How-
ever, unlike previous "supply flow" cases, 15 6 there was no allegation of a
detrimental effect upon the flow in question. In ruling the absence of this
allegation inconsequential, if Goldfarb is considered an "affecting com-
merce" case, the Court has apparently decided to define the words
"affecting commerce" to mean "have a connection with commerce."157
Under this interpretation, the only allegation required under the "affecting
commerce" test would be a connection with a substantial amount of inter-
state commerce.' 5 8
C. Future Effects of Goldfarb
Presently, it is unclear what effect Goldfarb will have upon the law
of Sherman Act jurisdiction. The possibilities range from no effect at
all to a vast expansion of jurisdiction if plaintiffs must now show a
defendant's connection with, rather than effect upon, interstate commerce.
Two cases decided since Goldfarb, Diversified Brokerage Services, Inc.
v. Greater Des Moines Board of Realtors 59 and Mortensen v. First
Federal Savings and Loan Association,'6" indicate that the lower courts
may be reluctant to interpret Goldfarb as expanding Sherman Act juris-
diction. Both cases involve activities which some courts still consider
too local for Sherman Act attention, and both indicate that the traditional
"affecting commerce" test element of a detrimental effect upon interstate
commerce is still considered a valid requirement for the standard's appli-
cation.
In Diversified Brokerage Services, two officers of an Iowa real estate
brokerage firm brought suit under the Sherman Act against a local
154. See note 59 supra.
155. See notes 59-64 and accompanying text supra.
156. See notes 82-108 and accompanying text supra.
157. The Court suggested that merely because there was no showing that home
buyers were discouraged from securing loans by the defendant's actions did not mean
that no effect upon commerce existed. 221 U.S. at 785. However, the Court never
stated what the effect was. See note 146 supra.
158. Using this analysis, the only distinction between the "affecting commerce"
test and the "in commerce" test would be that under the "affecting commerce" test
the connection would always have to be with a substantial amount of commerce while
this might not be required under the "in commerce" standard. See notes 57 & 58 and
accompanying text supra.
159. 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,443 (8th Cir. Aug. 20, 1975).
160. 1975-2 Trade Cas. 1 60,570 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 1975).
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board of real estate brokers for its refusal to grant them membership.' 6 '
In an attempt to show the interstate character of the board's brokerage
services, the plaintiffs had cited a survey of 16 percent of the 3000
listings on file with the board for the three years prior to the suit, which
indicated that five had involved non-Iowa residents.1 2 Nevertheless, in
affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action, the Eighth Circuit
distinguished Goldfarb upon the ground that the movement of only a few
non-Iowa residents into the state failed to show that the matter in ques-
tion had the necessary "interstate character" for jurisdiction. 163  Al-
though this finding of a lack of a connection with a substantial amount
of interstate commerce was enough to deny jurisdiction under Goldfarb,
the Diversified court additionally noted plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate
that any of defendant's activities placed a burden upon interstate
commerce.
64
Mortensen, too, presented a factual situation similar to that involved
in Goldfarb. In Mortensen, a couple which had obtained a mortgage
from a Westfield, New Jersey, lending institution objected to the institu-
tion's insistence upon having certain legal services incident to the under-
taking performed by its own counsel at the borrowers' expense.165 After
completing the transaction, plaintiffs brought suit charging, inter alia,
that defendant's activities constituted an illegal tying arrangement in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.16 6 After substantial discovery,
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 67 In
response, plaintiffs argued that defendant's actions both "occurred in"
and "substantially affected" interstate commerce. 168 The district court,
however, rejected both of plaintiffs' assertions and dismissed the com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction.' 69 Although plaintiffs' allegations were
similar to those involved in Goldfarb,10 the Mortensen court ruled that
161. Id. at 66,952. Plaintiffs contended that this amounted to a group boycott and
was thus a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act as stated in Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See note 67 supra.
162. 1975-2 Trade Cas. at 66,953.
163. Id. at 66,953-54.
164. Id. at 66,954.
165. 1975-2 Trade Cas. at 67,496. These services routinely consisted of the exami-
nation and certification of title, the drafting and recording of mortgages, and the
closing of title in the borrower. Id. at 67,498.
166. Id. at 67,496. Plaintiffs also charged that defendant's actions violated New
Jersey antitrust law and Federal Home Loan Bank Board Regulations. Id. at 67,496-97.
167. Id. at 67,497.
168. Id. at 67,498.
169. Id. at 67,497-502.
170. Plaintiff charged that the defendant obtained both investment funds and
depositors' insurance from interstate sources, made loans which were guaranteed by
federal agencies and other enterprises outside of New Jersey, had perhaps 25% of its
customers originate loans while residing outside of the state, and competed for local
mortgages with nearby New York banks. Id. at 67,498. Also, plaintiffs charged that
defendant's actions "'impair[ed] the flow of buyers from other states into New
Jersey' " and "'impede[d] insurance, construction and other products and services
associated with the transfer of residential real property.'" Id. at 67,500.
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"real estate financing is essentially a local enterprise.' 7' Further, while
Goldfarb was distinguished upon the ground that that case involved
out-of-state lenders while the Mortensen defendant was a local lender, 1 72
the trial court stressed that the decision to dismiss rested upon the fact
that none of the interstate commerce involved would be adversely affected
by the charged violation.'73 The Mortensen court, like the Fourth Circuit
in Goldfarb, noted that it was solely the local market for legal services
that would be substantially influenced by the defendant's practices. 7 4 The
Mortensen court observed:
The logical and probable effects of the [defendant's] activities
will be to restrict competition among New Jersey lawyers in the
market for legal services, and to deny purchasers in that market a
free choice among attorneys. But it is neither logical nor probable
that the defendants' conduct will, as plaintiffs claim, exert any effect
on demand in the market for real property financing. 1 75
V. CONCLUSION
During the past century, jurisdictional law under the Sherman Act
has evolved in such a way as to reach activities once universally considered
beyond the scope of federal regulation. However, this constant expansion
and redefinition has occurred at the expense of certainty and clarity.
In the past 30 years, this situation has perhaps been aggravated by the
Supreme Court's failure to give much guidance for the consideration of
such problems. Instead, lower federal courts have been left the task of
determining which cases could be heard under the Sherman Act. To
aid in this determination, two jurisdictional tests have been developed.
Though neither test has eliminated the need to consider a case's individual
facts, each at least provides a common ground for discussion and inter-
pretation in this area. Nevertheless, other courts have stated that
jurisdictional questions in antitrust cases are so interrelated to substantive
considerations that the two must be decided together.176
In view of the substantial uncertainty in this area, it was somewhat
surprising that the Supreme Court in Goldfarb failed to supply much
guidance. Possibly the Court was more concerned with the "state action"
or "learned profession" issues also involved in the suit. Alternatively,
after granting certiorari, the Goldfarb court could have decided that this
particular case was not an appropriate vehicle for a major enunciation of
Sherman Act jurisdictional guidelines. Perhaps, in choosing to ignore
171. Id. at 67,498.
172. Id. at 67,500-01 n.18.
173. Id. at 67,498-502.
174. Compare id. at 67,498-502 with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1,
16 (4th Cir. 1974).
175. 1975-2 Trade Gas. 1 60,570, at 67,500 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 1975).
176. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text supra.
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recent developments in the field,' 7 7 it was felt that Goldfarb should be
read narrowly and that the lower courts should generally be permitted
to continue applying their own tests.
The eventual impact of Goldfarb is, of course, at this time unclear.
Initially, because of the general nature of the Supreme Court's opinion,
courts have been hesitant to ignore what their brothers on the lower
federal bench have been doing during the High Court's period of rela-
tive inactivity. Thus, they have been slow to read the Chief Justice's
opinion as broadly as they might. In the long run, however, Goldfarb's
more ad hoc approach could lead to a further expansion of Sherman Act
jurisdiction. If so, still more confusion could result in this area since
no workable test was laid down for determining the parameters of this
new jurisdictional scope.
Kevin S. Anderson
177. The most recent case the Court cited in discussing the jurisdictional question
was United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
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